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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
A.M. BELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
PARLEY P. JONES,
~,

Defendant and Appellant.

In this case, plaintiff filed a straight suit on a promissory installment note for $850.00, making the usual allegations, and demanded judgment against defendant and appellant on the installments then due. In his original complaint, the plaintiff did not allege or claim that he was a
bona fide purchaser for value of the note. But, after defendant filed his answer, alleging that the said :note had
been ·compromi'Sed and settled by the scaledown agreement (Ex. 10, Ab. 12), signed by the payee, Alfred J. Bell,
the plaintiff filed his "Amended and Supplemental Complainf' alleging that he was a "bona fide holder for value
of said note without notice of defect of the title thereof."
The court found plaintiff was :not a bona fide holder for
value.
Defendant filed his answer and counter-claim to the
amended and .supplemental complaint (Ab. 3), praying
judgment on his counter-claim for $277.70, as wrongfully
collected by plaintiff on said note, due to the fact that the
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same had been ·comprom1sed and settled by the scaledown
agreement. Defendant also alleged (Ab. 5), that plaintiff
is estopped, from asserting or claiming that any sum was
now due from defendant to the payee, Alfred J. Bell, who
had signed the scaledown agreement. Defendant aLso alleged in his Supplemental Answer (A b. 6), that the balance of the indebtedness from defendant to Alfred J. Bell
was fully paid by defendant signing notes and mortgage totalling _$1100.00, about December 1, 1930, for Alfred J. ,.
Bell, which amount was paid by defendant. Appellant,
also alleged that at the time of the scaledown agreement,
August, 1934, defendant did not owe and was not indebted
to Alfred J. Bell in excess of $400.00, which sum was fully
compromised., scaled-down and settled by the scaledown
agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell.
This a:ction was commenced in the City Court of Logan City, which court held that the note sued on was compromised and settled by the iScaledown agreement, and
dismi·ssed the ·complaint. Plaintiff appealed. The District Court entered its findings of fact and .conclusions of
law and judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant; frol!l which judgment defendant ha·s appealed to
this court. The Distri·ct Court held, however, that "plaintiff wa:s not a bona fide holder in due course, but merely
held said note as an assignee from Alfred J. Bell, the
payee."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

ARGUMENT.
1. The Cou..rt e·rred in entering its judgment against de-

fend·ant for the amount of the note $876.89 and $85~.00 attorney's fees, and afro. in adjudging that the said l1/m0Unt
is and represent'S the balanc·e due om the purchas,e price of
certain land specifically described in the judgment. (Assignment of Errors, No. 1, 9, and 15.)
Respondent's counsel argued in the court below that
~,under the provisions of the N. I. L. (Se·c. 61-1-25, Revised
Statutes) providing that "every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration", that a consideration was presumed in
plaintiff's favor and that the burden of proof rested upon
the defendant, to prove no consideration, with respect to
the question of the consideration for the note sued on.
The Court below accepted that argument and rendered judgment accordingly against appellant. It is appellant's contention that the ·consideration presumed, by the
statute, is merely prima fa_cie; that when that consideration is seriously questiOlned by substantial evidence, then
that presumption fades away., and the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff to prove consideration by the preponderance of the evidence, and if he fails to do so he cannot recover. In other words, the burden of proof in the
first instance was, and ,continued to be with respondent;
the ~statutory prima fa·cie presumption, merely relieved
respondent from going forward with the burden of proof
in the first instant. Hudson v~s. Moon, 130 P. 774 (Ut.)
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In ca'Se at bar it is submitted that respondent failed
~ support the burden of proof which rested on him in this
case. On the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence
clearly shows there wa'S no consideration for the note sued
on. The escrow agreeme,~t, Ex. 6 (Ab. 14), for $3200.00
dated February 6, 1928, recites that $200.00 was paid as
a down payment, receipt of which i·s acknowledged by Alfred J. Bell in the contract. That escrow agreement also
recites that the Utah Mortgage Loan Lorporation had a'\
$'2500.00 mortgage against said premises, which Alfred J.
Bell, the seller, agreed to pay and clear up. This escrow
agreement was assigned and transferred by Alfred J. Bell
and wife, to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corp_oration, a'S witnessed by assignment attached to the es·crow agreement,
{Ex. 6), assigning all of their right, title and interest in
said escrow agreement and all payments to be made thereunder to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation. Thus Alfred J. Bell assigned and transferred to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, his interest in that es·crow contract, and no money was payable to him thereunder.
It is thus clear that no money whatever was due or
payable to Alfred J. Bell, on the said escrow agreement.
There is no evidence that it was ever assigned back to
Bell. Hence, as the evidence stands, no money whatsoever i:s due Bell under that contract.
Furthermore, from undi'Sputed documentary evidence
{the paid ·check) , Alfred J. Bell's equity in that escrow
agreement, could not, after said assignment {covering the
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$2500.00 mortgage) exceed $400.00 under any circumstance, in August, 1934; even assuming that the Utah
Mortgage Loan Corporation had. assigned or transferred
that escrow agreement back to Bell, after the $2500.00
mortgage was paid, of which plaintiff produced no evidence, and which the court has no right to assume. Appellant produced paid checks to Alfred J. Bell totalling
$580.00 (Ex. 12), paid between the time of the escrow
' agreement (Ex. 6) and the scaledown agreement (Ex. 10).
The agreement acknowledges a $200.00 down payment,
making $780.00, plus the $2500.00 mortgage, makes a total
of $3280.00 paid by Jones to Bell up to July 1934. At that
time, Alfred J. Bell ·signed a s·caledown agreement stating
that the existing indebtedness was $400.00. Considering
accumulated interest, this would be about corre·ct, assuming that any equity in that escrow had been assigned back
to Bell, of which there is no evidence.
J'

Appellant and his witness, Boudrero, both testified
that he borrowed about $2000.00 from Boudrero to pay on
that escrow agreement. Alfred J. Bell admitted he knew
that Jones made a loan from Boudrero to pay Bell on that
contract (Ab. 25, Tr. 63). That this money was paid on
the $2500.00 indebtedness which Bell owed the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, i·s evident from the fa·ct that, at
the time when Jones made his loan from the Federal Land
Bank, Boudrero's claim was admitted to be prior in right

to the claim of Alfred J. Bell.
The evidence thus shows, considering the payments
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made, and the assig"~nment of the escrow agreement by Alfred J. Bell to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, that
Alfred J. Bell did not and could not have $850.00 coming

to him in July, 1934, but that the scale down agreement,
which recites $400.00 a'S the existing obligation in July,
1934, was about correct, if the escrow agreement had been
as:signed back to Bell, which does not appear from the evidence.
It is therefor submitted that respondent failed to
'SUstain the burden of proof which rested upon him

(~stand

ing in the shoes of the payee, Alfred J. Bell), relative to
showing $850.00 then due, as consideration for said note.
But as stated, the evidence ·shows that not to exceed
$400.00 ·could then have been due, which amount was settled by the scaledown agreement. Hence there is no consideration for the .note sued on.
Furthermore, on the point of no consideration for the
note ·sued on: The trial court found that the existing obligation of appellant to Alfred J. Bell was $1250.00 We
have already pointed out that this is in conflict with the
scaledown agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell, which
states it was $400.00, and which also recites: "The undersigned creditor of said applicant hereby agrees that it will
accept the sum of $150.00 in full satisfaction of the existing obligation." The Federal Land Bank also, understood
(as appears from paragraph No. 5 of its closing statement,
A b. 13) that Alfred J. Bell had agreed "to accpet the sum
of $150.00 in full satisfaction of his claim."

Assuming,
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but not admitting that the existing obligation was $1250.00,
it is appellant''S contention and position that an agreement
to accept, and the acceptance of a lesser amount, from a
third party as full satisfaction of an existing larger obligation, constitutes a novation, or accord and satisfaction,

J

~

and releases the whole indebtedness. Hence, it follows,
that in as much as the original obligation (whatever its
amount) was released and 'Settled by the acceptance of a
lesser sum, that there is no consideration for the promissory note sued on in case at bar; which riote was given to,
and secretly exacted by Alfred J. Bell, in contravention of
his scaledown agreement.
Part payment by third party, received by the creditor
in full satisfaction of his claim is a good accord and :satisfaction, as the creditor receives a benefit in securing the
payment by such third party; otherwise, due to the final
condition of the debtor, he may not have been able to
secure payment of any part of the debt. This rule has
been held to a.pply even though at the time of the payment
the creditor was 'not aware that the stranger was acting
for the debtor, 1 Am. Jur. 247. This being so, the court
in Sigler vs. Sjgler, 98 Kan. 524, 158 P. 864., L.R.A. 1917A,
725, did not see how a creditor's righs are affected in the
slightest by his failure to know and understand that a
third person is acting as the agent of the debtor in making settlement.
The court further erred in finding and adjudging that
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the amount found due on the note is the balance due on the
purchase price of the following described land:
The North half of Lot 3 and all of Lot 4 of BlO'ck
3, Plat "D" Logan Farm Survey, containing thirty
acres, less the land occupied by the O.S.L.R.R.
·situated in the Northwest Quarter of Section
twenty-eight, Township Twelve North, Range One
East of the Salt Lake Meridian.
Together with any and all water rights and irri1
gation ditches belonging or in anywise appertain- t
ing thereto, and especially including twenty-one
shares in the Logan Northwest Field Irrigation
Company.
No ,such obligation or claim is made by respondent in
his pleading. Thus, without any such issue or claim being made or raised in the pleadings, the court held that
respondent had a vendor'·s lien on certain described premises, fo!" the amount and to the extent of the judgment
rendered. How the· court found out that appellamt owned
those premises i·s a mystery to us.
Respondent commenced this action. as a simple suit
on a promi·ssory note, praying for a personal judgment.
The court granted him a judgment, secured by a vendor's
lien, without appellant claiming or asking for it in his
pleadings. The vendor's lien, by provisions of Sec. 38-0-1,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is ,superior to the Homestead right. Thus it will be observed that the lower
·court granted respondent a judgment lien equal in rank
to a mortgage, for it can be enforced against a homestead
right of appellant in the premises. Thus, without a.ny
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amendment, or any pleading to justify it, the court converted a simple action in personam to an action in rem;
for if this judgment stands, respondent may now proceed
to enforce his vendor's lien any time against the property
described in the judgment.
It is submitted that such a judgment thus departing
from the issues raised as well as the form theory of the
action, is reversable error.

It is fundamental that the

trial ·court cannot thus arbitrarily change or depart from
the theory of the action as fixed by the pleadings, and
render a different or additional judgment than that prayed for.

Plaintiff cannot try his case on one theory or

pleading and arbitrarily shift to and recover on another.
1 C. J. 1Q06., 1 C. J. Sec. 1087.

In the case, Combined Metal'S vs. Bastian, 267 Pac.
1020, this .court held.
"The power of the court to permit amendment
of pleading does not authorize importation, which
in effect introduces a new or different cause of
action.''
It is submitted that the Judgment as rendered was
such obvious departure by the Court from the form of
action, and the i~ssues raised in the pleadings, that no
further argument is necessary on this point.
7 Stan. Ency. of Proceedure, 111-138.

The Court erred in failing to find that the note
sued an repres'ented the existing obligation from appellant to Alfred J. Berzl, the payee in the note,, and in fail2.
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ing to find and' hold that p,laintiYf .and/or Alfred J. Bell
were estopped from· alaim.ing D"r a.sserting that the existing obligation was any other or-

different

su.m

than

his scal.e:.dJown
agreement Ex. 10, (Assignment of Errors No. 3, 4, 13).
Appellant alleged and testified and Alfred J. Bell
admitted (A b. 25, Tr. 72), that appellant was not indebted to him for any sum ·except such as was incurred 1}
through the execution of the es·crow agreement (Ex. 6).
Respondent produced no evidence to the contrary.
Alfred J. Bell admitted that he signed and executed
the scale down agreement (Ex. 10, A b. 12). That agreement reads as follows:

$400.00, as represented by Alfred J. B'ell in

AGREEMENT.
"The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and/or
the Land Bank Commissioner, having agreed to
make a loan to Parley P. Jones, on certain conditions, which conditions are made a part of this
agreement and among which is the condition that
the applicant's total obligations, both secured and
unsecured, .shall not exceed the amount of Four
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($4700.00) when
said loan i·s completed.
No'\\r, therefor, the under~signed creditor of said
applicant hereby agrees that it will accept the sum
of $150.00 in full satisfaction of the existing obligation of $400.00 now due it from said appHcant
and will execute a full and unconditional release of
said obligation upon the payment of the sum herein
agreed to be accepted, payment to be made in
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds.
Signed: Alfred J. Bell."
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Thus, in order to induce the Federal Land Bank to
make its loan to Jones, Alfred J. Bell specifically represented that the existing obligation from Parley P. Jones
to him was $400.00, and agreed that he would accept the

sum of $150.00 as full~satisfaction of said existing obligation, whi·ch amount was paid. ·Having made such an
agreement and representation, and having induced the
Federal Land Bank thereby to make its loan to appellant,
and having received his $150.00 from

the Federal

Land Bank pursuant to such representation, it is
submitted that Bell Is estopped from thereafter
asserting or claiming anything different.
It was
therefor _error for the court to hold _(Conclusion of Law
No. 4) that respondent was not e,stopped from asserting
and claiming that the note sued on was not and did not
represent the existing obligation between appellant and
Alfred J. Bell, at the time the scaledown agreement was
signed. Such finding is in the very teeth of the admitted
and undisputed evidence, the signed statement of Alfred
J. Bell.
It was likewise error of the trial court to hoi d that
Bell "is· not estopped from asserting and ·claiming that
the said note sued on is a valid and existing obligation
and that the same was not compromised and settled by
the scaledown agreement, on or about August13, 1934,
and that the same was not included in said .scaledown
agreement signed by Alfred J. Bell in consideration of
making said loan to defendant and was not compromised
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for the sum of $150.00 or otherwise." Such finding is
likewise contrary to the undisputed evidence, the scaledown agreement.
3.

The Court "likeUJise errred in its Fifnding No. 5,

findmg that a"i the time of the execution of the said note,
defendamt was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of
$1250.00, etc.

This was error because:

It was wholly outside and a departure from
any ·claim or issue rai"Sed by the pleading1s. Such an idea
first occured to plaintiff's counsel at the close of the trial.
We were taken by complete surprise when counsel suggested that to his witness. In the City Court, counsel
conceded that the $400.00 s·caledown should be credited
on he promi~ssory note. At the ·conclusion of the trial in
the District Court, counsel suggested this new idea to Mr.
Bell, who agreed that was probably correct. The, trial
court adopted that as correct, without any pleading, or
any issued formed thereon.
(a)

(b)
ing.

There was no evidence to support such a find-

'The plaintiff produced no valid testimony to that

effect. In examining plaintiff's witnes1s, Alfred J. Bell,
plaintiff's counsel, by leading questions, asked the witness if the indebtedness. was not $1250.00 at the time of
the scaledown agreement? and if it was not a fact that
the s.caledown of $400.00 left a balance of $850.00, for
which the note was given? Alfred J. Bell, the witness
all!Swered, that he thought that was it, or words to that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J

effect. Certainly such evidence ·cannot be accepted as
sufficient to support a judgment, particularly one departing from the pleadings, and contrary to the documentary
evidence, as has been heretofore pointed out.
4. The Corurt erred in its Finding No. 9, that s;aid
note UJaSJ not maJ.de and detivered through inadverrtance
and mistake, etc. (Error No. 11).
We have already pointed out that the evidence (paid
checks) conclusively shows (considering the admission in
the escrow agreement of $200.00 paid, and the assignment to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation to cover
$2500.00 out of the escrow), that no more than $400.00
could possible have been due Alfred J. Bell, August 1934,
even assuming that the balance of the escrow agreement, if
any were due, was assigned hack to Bell of which respondent produced no evidence. That being true, and
Alfred J. Bell having also signed a scale down agreement
in July or August, 1934, stating that the existing indebt-

.

edness was $400.00 and agreeing to take $150.00 as settlement thereof,-why isn't that quite conclusive proof that
appellant signed that $850.00 note through inadvertance
and mistake? If A can prove, and B al~so admits, in a
written statement, that A didn't owe B over $400.00, but
nevertheless signs a promissory note to B for $850.00,the .court should not hesitate to find that A signed such
note through inadvertance and mistake as he alleges and
claims he did at the trial.
In addition to that, we invite the court's attention
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to the testimony of Alfred J. Bell (Ab. 25). Few

wi~

nes1ses have ever taken the witness· stand who were so
indefinite hazy and uncertain in their testimony, or in
what they were saying. Appellants memory was also very
poor. It is .not difficult to see how these two men could
make mi,stake by inadvertance. It is easy to see how they
could and did make mistakes in their financial dealings.
Alfred J. Bell assigns his interest in the escrow agreement over to the Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, which
he has apparently entirely forgotten. He likewise forgot
to have it assigned back to him after Jones has paid the
$2500.00 mortgage indebtedness thereon, nevertheless, he
goes right on and assumes that the equity (if any exists)
belongs to him. The Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation
turned the assigned contract, attached to the assignment
(both documents admitted in evidence, Ex 6)., over to
Parley P. Jones. Bell hasn't a thing to show that Jones
is indebted to him for one dollar. But nevertheless, Jones
apparently si~ns a note for $850.00 to Alfred J. Bell.
About the same time or a couple of week·s later, Bell signs
a scaledown agreement, stating that the existing indebtedness from Jones to him is $400.00 and he agrees to
accept $150.00, a:s settlement thereof, which amount is
paid to 'him by the Federal Lank Bank in persuance to
said scaledown agreement. ,He did not .surrender the note
as he should have done when he received the $150.00.
Later on he starts to collect on the note. Jones figures he
is bound in as much as he failed to have the note delivered
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up, and starts to make payment thereon. The money thus
paid should be returned as prayed for in the counter claim.

The Court erred in its Firnding No. 7, and in its
Conclusion of Law No. 3, that Alfred J. BeU did' not represent in his scaledaum agreement, that the existing obligation at that time was $400.00, and in ho~dirng that the
note sru.ed on was not compromised and settled by the
scaled'own agreem.ent (Errors 10, 12).
5.

In discussing this important legal question, the effect
of a scaledown agreement, we must assume that appellant was indebted to Alfred J. Bell in excess of the
amount of $400.00, which appellant does not admit. Appellant illJSists that respondent had the burden of proof,
and failed to prove such fact. We have pointed out that
from the evidence adduced, Jones could not, in July, 1934,
have owed Bell in excess of $400.00.
The trial ·court found that at the time of __the scaledown agreement, August, 1934, appellant was indebted
in the sum of $1250.00 to Alfred J. Bell. We have pointed out that there is no evidence to support or justify such
finding, nor is there any pleading alleging or claiming
such fact. If this court should decide that appellant wa8
not indebted to Alfred J. Bell in excess of $400.00, at the
time of the scaledown agreement, August, 1934, then it
would necessarily follow that the note for $850.00 was
not only without consideration, but had been made
through inadvertance and mistake.
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If this court shall conclude from the evidence that
appellant was indebted to Alfred J. Bell $850.00 (the
amount of the note), or $1250.00 (as the trial court
found), at the time when the scale down agreement was
signed, then the question arises: What was the legal effect, in either case, of signing the scaledown agreement?
If the indebtedness was more than $400.00 at the
time when the 'Scaledown agreement was signed, then we
submit that Alfred J. Bell is not only estopped, from later
asserting or ·claiming that it was any larger or different
amount, but the said scaledown agreement compromised
and settled the indebtedness, whatever its amount.
It is submitted that the purpose and intent of the
Federal Farm Loan Act was to help the land owner, the
farmer, who was in financial distress, to assi,st him in getting on a better financial basis, and to assist such borrower to procure an accord and satisfaction and a s.caledown among his ·creditors.
It is appellant's contention that the note sued on was
settled by an accord and sati·sfaction. The Federal Land
Bank would not make its loan unless the creditors with
liens on the borrowers land definitely agreed to ac.cept
the amount of ·cash which was available as satisfactiont
of their claims. Many ·creditors are willing to accept a
reduction in order to secure cash. Such reductions are
p_assed on to the borrower. If a secret side agreement is
permitted, by which the debtor 'agrees to pay his creditor the amount, or a portion of it, which the creditor has
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agreed, by his ·scaledo:wn agreement, to scale off, in consideration of getting .cash, then it is obvious that the
main party benefitted is not
creditor.

the

borrower,

but

his

In the case McAllister vs. Drapeau, 92 Pac. 2nd, 915,
the California Supreme Court, discussing an H. 0. L. C.
case .said:
'_'***Obviously, before these facts could be ascertained, a full disclosure of the amount and the
term·a of the proposed second lien would have to be
made to the H. 0. L. C. The securing of a second
lien by the creditor without such disclosure is
clearly violation of the letter and spirit of the statute and regulations. This is demonstrated not only
by the terms of the statute and the regulations,
but also by the language of the agreement above
quoted that all creditors were required to sign
wherein the creditor represented and agreed that
he was accepting the bonds 'in full settlement of
the claim of the undersigned'.'·
"The obtaining of secret second liens by the
creditor violates the basic public policy expressed
in the act. The act was intended solely for the
benefit of home owners who were in financial difficulties-no one else was eligible for its benefits.
Any benefit to creditor1s was merely incidental. But
if a creditor ·could lawfully exact a secret second
lien from his debtor, in many cases this would confer the benefits of the act on the creditor rather
than on the debtor.***"
"***Our examination of the authorities has failed to dis·close a single case upholding the validity
of such secret second mortgage.***"
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"Several of.the courts to which the problem here
involved ha:s been presented, in addition to holding the secret second mortgage illegal, have held
that in signing the 'Mortgagee's Consent to Take
Bonds'., above quoted, the creditor agreed to accept
such bonds 'in full settlement' of his claim, and
that such agreement ~onstitutes an accord and sati'Sfaction, a relea;se or a novation. Cook vs. Donner,
supra; Chaves County Building & Loan Ass'n vs.
The holding of the"Se courts is
Hodgfls, supra.
sound. The agreement signed by the creditor was
to accept the bonds "in full settlement of the claim
of the undersigned***."
In the case International Harvester Co. vs. Young,
285 N. W. 12, 288 Mich. 463, the court held that any agreement made by the borrower (in case at bar, appellants
note for $850.00) in the face of a 'Scaledown agreement, is
void as contrary to publi'c policy. In that case,_ the court
said:
"The defendants claim that the note and mortgage were :not executed until sometime in February, 1935. The ·court believes they were mistaken
in this, but at any rate it does not appear to be importanet whether the note an·d ·mortgage were executed before colllSumma tion of the loan or afterwords, the important point being that the bill of
sale was executed before the consummation, to
take effect at the consummation, and all of the
parties agree that this bill of sale was executed on
or about September 10, 1934, and during the negotiations for the loan. It wa'S thi~s instrument that
enabled the plaintiff to secure from the defendants
the chattel ·mortgage and note recured thereby.''
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" 'The Federal Land Bank and Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation are instrumentalities of the
United States.'
Smith vs. Kansas City T. & T. Co., 255 U. S. 180;
Federal Land Bank vs. Gaines, 290 U. S. 247.
The purpose of making this particular loan was
not only to save the borrower's real estate from
foreclosure of ex1"sting mortgages but to settl'e all
other outstanding indebtedness, whether ~secured
or not. If the amount that could be loaned, based
on an appraisal of the property, was insufficient
to meet all of the outstanding obligations, then the
creditors were compelled, as a condition to the loan
being made, to scale down their indebtedness to a
point where the amount that could be loaned was
sufficient to cover all debts."
"The purposes of the legislation permitting the
loaning of money to farmer for rehabilitation purposes are similar to the purposes of the Home Owners' Loan Act, but more comprehensive since it
applies to all of the d.ebts of the borrowe·r and not
to mortgages on the homestead alone.
In both of the cases cited the court holds that
the additional evidence, of debt, cannot be enforced because against public policy. The additional
security or evidence of debt were there taken secretly as in the present case, is void. In the latter
case the court says:
'The test is not what the plaintiff did in withholding action on the note for a proper period, but
rather what the plaintiff and others could do if
such a practice were to receive judicial approval.
In principle, if this action is permissible under the
statutei then the authorized holder of a second
mortgage could secretly take back a note payable
the :next day and immediately enforce this obliga-
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tion to the utter destruction of the purpose of the
statute. A survey of the transa:ction as a whole
leads to the conclusion that to give validity to the
note sued upon would be to sanction a violation of
the spirit of the statute and contravene public
policy.'
Additional security to that agreed to be accepted
under the Home Owners' Loan Act was also held
to be unenforceable in
Stager vs. Junker, et al, (N.J.) 188 Atl. 440, and
Chaves Co. Bldg. & D & L Ass'n vs. Hodges (N.
Mex.) 59 Pa·c. 671.
In the latter case the decision tuf!ns upon the
question of aecord and oatisfaction, with reference
also to the question of public policy.
In F,ederal Land Bank of Columbia, et al. vs.
Blackshear Bank et al. (Ga.) 186 S. E., 724, the
court says:
'The creditor who made this agreement as a part
of the ·condition upon which the lender proposed to
make the loan could not afterwards enforce a
mortgage which he had taken on other property of
the debtor pending the negotiations for the loan
and in contemplation thereof, but without the
knowledge of the lender, covering the difference
between the full amou:nt of his claim against the
debtor and the reduced amount which he agreed
to accept in full settlement thereof, where the enforcement of such mortgage might in any way imperil the security taken by the lender under the
conditions above .stated, or hinder the debtor in the
fulfillment of his obligation to the lender. What is
said above applies also to the prosecution to judgment of a small note for $173 which one of the
creditors had taken under the same circumstances·
'
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because, if the holder of this note be permitted to
reduce it to judgment, he would, by reason of that
judgment, be in a position to make such assertion
of it as "\vould interfere with the scheme that was
entered into, whereby the debtor was released
from a part of his debts to the original creditor so
as to obtain the loan referred to above'."
''***It is sufficient if the plaintiff has by accepting the bill of sale from the borrower and the mortgage and notes from the defendants interfered
with the scheme whereby the borrower was supposed to be released from his debts to his various
creditors and the one debt to the land bank under
more favorable conditions substituted therefor.
The securing of the bill of sale from Earl R.
Young- in addition to the amount agreed to be aceepted in full settlement, was in violation of the
spirit and purpose of the Federal Land Bank Act,
and the instrument was void as contrary to public
policy."
"The counsel for plaintiff argues that the land
bank was only acting as the agent for Earl R.
Young in the disbursement of the proceeds of the
loan, but the making of the loan depended upon all
of the debts of the borrower being paid, and the
circumstances made the Federal Land Bank a third
party to such an extent as to make the advancement by it to the plaintiff a payment by a third
party constituting an accord and 'Satisfaction althougp in a Ie,ss amount than the amount of the
debt. This is indicated in the J ~ssewich First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. and Chaves C. ,Bldg. &
D & I..J cases hereinbefore ·cited, as applied to the
·Home Owners' Loan Corporation. If it applies to
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation it should
apply to the Federal Land Bank inaJSmuch as re-
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habilitation purposes of the Home Loan Act only
applies to homesteads, while the Federal Land
Bank Act applies to all of the property and debts
of the borrower."
A 'Second mortgage taken without knowledge of
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, in violation of
statute and regulations thereunder, as security for
part payment of judgment released by refunding,
was void and unenforceable as against public policy. Home Owners' Loan Act 1933, art. 4 (k), 12
U. S. C. A. art. 1463 (k) .-Markowitz vs. Berg, 4
a. 2nd 410, 125 N. J. Eq. 56.
Matters to be considered in determining validity
of mortgagors' agreement to remain bound on balance of original indebtedness after refinancing of
obligation through Home Owners' Loan Corporaation are the absence of collusion or concealment of
the obligation from the authorized officials of the
corporation and their consent to the mortgagors'
continued obligation for the bala:nce. 12 U. S. C.
U. art. 1461 et seq.-Keystone Bank of Spangler,
Pa. v~s. Pooth, 6 A. 2nd 417.
Where, while negotiations for a Home Owners'
Loan Corporation loan are pending; the existing
mortgagee secretly obtains from the owner a new
mortgage in an amount greater than permitted for
a junior lien by the corporation's rule, and thereafter advises the corporation that it will accept
the proceeds of the new mortgage and a junior
lien in the permitted amount, but nevertheless, its
original mortgage having been satiiSfied and the
Home Owners' Loan Corr>oration mortgage recorded, proceeds to record the secretly obtained mortgage, its action is illegal and the mortgage void.Masci vs. Moose Building & Loan Ass'n, 33 D. & C.
458.
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Where vendors pursuant to refinancing plan assigned vendor's lien notes to Federal Land Bank
under assignment reciting that all notes not included therein were paid and lien securing payment
thereof released, second lien notes executed by
purchasers to vendors for amount advanced by
vendors to saisfy judgment against purchasers
plus difference between bal~nce owing on vendor's
lien notes and bonds received in exchange therefor
were void together with liens securing them so far
as they brought forward any part of vendor's lien
notes because thwarting purpose, spirit and policy
of Farm Mortgage Act under which debt was refinanced.
Emergency Farm Act of 1933 article
32-35, 12 U. S. C. A. article 1016-1019; Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U. S. C. A.
art. 1020 et seq.-Mc Crary vs. Smeltzer, 124 S.
W. 2d 336, reversing Smeltzer vs. McCrory, 101 A.
w. 2d 850.
Where vendor and vendee agreed that vendor
would represent to Federal Land Bank that vendee's indebtedness to vendor for realty had been
reduced to amount of loan by land bank which was
in amount of three-fourths of appraised value of
land, and vendee agreed to execute notes to vendor
in excess of amount of loan, notes given by vendeed
in excess of amount of loan by Federal Land Bank
would be void as violative of Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act. Emergency Farm Mortgage Act"
1933, Art. 32-35, 12 U. S. C. A. art. 1016-1019.Briley v~s. Oldham, 124 S. W. 2d 854, reversing Oldham vs. :Briley, 118 S. W. 2d 797.
Notes obtained by a ·creditor in violation of a
scale-down agreement entered into between the
creditor and a farm debtor at the behest of the
Federal Land Bank as a part of a refinancing plan
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are void, irrespective of fact that the Federal Land
Bank acquires a first mortgage or a first deed of
trust under the plan..-O'Neil vs. Johnson, 29 F.
Supp. 307.
Notes obtained by creditor in violation of a
scale-down agreement entered into between the
creditor and farm debtors at behest of Federal
Land Bank as part of refinancing plans were void
as against the Federal Land Bank as well as
against debtors, notwithstanding that a receive·r
acted for the ·creditor and obtained a court order
approving the settlement of the .claims against
debtors, where court was not informed as to the
circumstances under which notes were exacted
and Land Bank made the loan without knowledge
of the exaction of the notes by the receiver. 12 U.
S. C. A. art. 192.-0'Neil vs. Johnson, 29 F. Supp.
307.
Building and loan association's action, after accepting bonds in less amount than mortgage debt
from Home Owners' Loan Corporation in full settlement of a:s·sociation's claim against mortgaged
property in taking a second trust deed, stock certificates, and grant deed as security from mortgagor for balance of indebtedness, was illegal and
void. Home Owners' Loan A·ct 1933, 48 Stat. 128,
12 U. S. C. A. eart 1461 et seq.-Woods vs. Kern
Mut. Building & Loan Ass'n 93 P. 2d 837.
Where savings and loan company agreed to accept :Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds in
less amount than mortgage debt in settlement of
company'·s claim against mortgaged property, but
also required mortgagor to pay $500 in cash and
give a note for $500, the transaction was void as
violative of the basic public policy expressed in
the Home Owners' Loan Act.
Home Owners'
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Loan Act 1933, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. Art.
1463 et seq.-Richard R. Adams Co. vs. Pacific
States Savings & Loan Co., 94 P. 2d 370.
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation is a public
agency, and a note taken in contravention of
creditor's agreement with corporation, whereby
creditor agreed to accept a lesser sum in full of
her ·claim against debtor, is. void as against public
policy. 12 U. S. C. A. Art. 1467; U. S. C. A. Const.
art, 1 art 10; Amend. 5.-Johnson vs. Matthews,
22 N. E. 2d 772, 301 Ill. App. 295.
Where mortgagee acquiring title by foreclosure
executed agreement consenting to accept bonds
of Home Owners' Loan Corporation and small
amount of cash and to release all claims against
property, second mortgage subsequently taken by
mortgagee without sanction of ·corporation was
void as against "public policy". Home Owners'
Loan Act 1933, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. art
1461 et seg.-Council vs. Cohen, 21 N. E. 2d 967.
Agreement made by mortgagee, who executed
to Home Owners' Loan Corporation release of all
his claims against mortgagor and received less
amount in bonds from Corporation, whereby mortgagor gave mortgagee .note and second mortgage
on the property to cover loss mortgagee had sustained in making release held against public policy, and to invalidate note and second mortgage
notwithstanding agreement was not secret and
"Principal Attorney" of Home Owners' Loan Corporation allegedly ratified agreement by recog.nizing validity of note and second mortgage. Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended, 12 U. S.
C. A. art 1461 et seq., art 1463 (k) .-Cook v~s. Donner, 66 P. (2d) 587, 145 Kan. 67 4.
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Where mortgagee, i·n connection with procurement of loan from Home Owners' Loan Corporation, discharged mortgages as paid, and delivered
note secured by ·such mortgages to corporation,
secret renewal note exe-cuted by mortgagors to
mortgagee for balance of indebtedness held void
as against public policy.-First Citizens Bank &
Trust Co. of Utica vs. Speaker, 294, N. Y. S. 737,
modifying (Sup.) 287 N. Y. S. 831, 159 Misc. 427.
Where holders of vendor's lien notes received
from federal land bank portion of loan to purcha·sers in exchange for assignment of all .notes not
fully paid, notes thereafter executed by purchasers to include balance on original vendor's lien
notes which remained unpaid held void (12 U. S.
C. A. art 1019; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 1536).
-Smeltzer vs. McCrory, 101 S. W. (2d) 850, error
granted.
Where bank holding mortgage agreed to take,
in full satisfaction of mortgage, bonds of Home
Owners' Loan Corporation within ninety days,
and where affidavit of bank president made at
date of closing of Joan after expiration of ninety
days stated that no agreement had been made
with home owner to pay discount on bonds, the
termination of the ninety-day provision was waived, as regards validity of contract of home owner
to pay difference between par value and market
value of bonds (Home Owner,g' Loan Act, 12 U. S.
C. A. art 1467 (e).-Pye vs. Grunert, 275 N. W.
615, rehearing denied 276 N. W. 221.
An agreement exacted by a lien holder which
tends to counteract the relief of the home owner
sought by the Home Owners' Loan Act in invalid
as contrary to the purpose of the act and regulations adopted thereunder. Home Owners' Loan
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Act of 1933, Art 4, as amended, 12 U. S. C. A. art
1463.-Meek vs. Wilson, 278 N. W. 731, 283 Mich.
679.
A second mortgage exacted by mortgagee in addition to payment in bonds and cash by Home
Owners' Loan Corporation in refinancing transaction was unenforeable as contrary to public policy where total amount of first mortgage and second mortgage was in exces'S of amount of appraised value of property, in violation of regulation of Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, art 1 et seq., as amended 12 U. S. C. A. art 1461 et seq.-Meek vs. Wilson, 278 N. W. 731, 283 Mich. 679.
Where holder of note accepted less than face
amount thereof in full settlement and transferred
note to Federal Land Bank under agreement with
maker and Federal Land Bank, note which was
subsequently executed by the same maker to
cover difference between fact amount of original
note and amount accepted in settlement wa'S not
supported by consideration.-Kinard vs. Bank of
Leno, 196 S. E. 920, 57 Ga. App. 819.
An agree~ent between mortgagee and home
owner made without approval of Home Owners'
Loan Corporation by which owner assumes or
agrees to pay all or any part of mortgage debt
which has been settled and releaJsed by the refunding effected by the ·corporation is void as
against public policy and cannot be enforced by
the mortgagee. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933,
art 4 (k), 12 U. S. C. A. art 1463 (k) .-Anderson
vs. Horst, 200 A. 721.
Mortgagors' unlawful agreement to pay mortgagee a part of mortgage debt which has been
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settled and released by the .refunding effected by
Home Owners' Loan Horporation could not be enforced by Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.
S. C. A. art 1461 et •seq.-Anderson vs. Horst, 200
A. 721.
Where vendor of realty and vendee agreed that
vendor would represent to the Federal Land Bank
that vendee's indebtedness to bank for realty had
been reduced to amount of loan by land bank
which was in amount of three-fourths of appraised value of land, or that vendor had canceled
vendee's debt in excess of loan, a:nd vendee agreed
to execute notes to vendor in excess of amount of
loan, and third person was substituted as purchaser for vendee, notes given by vendee or third
person in excess of amount of loan by Federal
Land Bank would be void as violative of statutes
and contrary to public policy. 12 U. S. L. A. art
771, subds. 4, (d), 5; are 781, sub d. 2; arts. 981,
987, 1016 (b), 1019.-0ldham vs. Briley, 118 S.
w. 2d 797.
In the ·court below, counsel for respondent stated
that in some of the H. 0. L. C. cases, the courts have held
that a side agreement between the borrower and ·creditor,
whereby the borrower give'S his note for the difference (or
a portion thereof), between the full amount of the debt,
and the amount the creditor actually receives in bonds
or otherwise from the H. 0. L. C. loan, have been held to
be valid and enforceable.
In all such cases, however, there was no scaledown
agreement or other representation by the creditor that
he would a·ccept a stated les,ser amount as settlement in
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full of the existing obligation. The courts are also careful, in those cases, where the side agreement is upheld, in
pointing out that the creditor must not have been guilty
of misrepresentation, fraud or deception in any manner
or respect, but must have acted openly and in g_ood faith.
In every case, so far as we have been able to check, where
the creditor has signed a S"caledown agreement, definitely
agreeing to accpet a lesser amount in satisfaction of his
existing oblig-ation against the debtor, the courts have
held not valid and unenforceable, as against public policy,
any side or secret agreement by which the creditor had
the debtor sig.n a Qote or other agreement to pay part or
all of the portion of the debt which was supposed to be
scaled down.
Counsel for respondent seeks to .excuse the act and ·conduct of Alfred J. Bell, by saying that he only agreed to
scale off $400.00 of the exi·sting obligation of $1250.00,
and then, took from the debtor the $850.00 note sued on,
for the balance. But Bell represented i:n his scaledown
agreement that the existing obligation was $400.00; and
he agreed to take $150.00 as settlement thereof. Hence,
by representing that the existing obligation was only
$400.00, and by taking a secret side agreement .note for
$850.00, he deceived and misled the Federal Land Bank
to exactly the ~same manner and extent as though he had
done it in the usual way,-stated, in hi~s scaledown agreement that the existing obligation was $1250.00 and had
agreed to take $150.00 as settlement thereof; and had
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then taken appellant's side note for $850.00, representi,ng. a portion of the indebtedness which he had been
scaled off. In either case, the effect and result is exactly the same. The Federal Land Bank was misled, but induced to make the loan to the borrower, and pay over
certain money to the creditor's, which the Federal La:nd
Bank did upon the understanding that those creditors
were paid and .settled in full. Alfred J. Bell, by this cunning method, interfered with the scheme whereby the
borrower was supposed to be released from his debts to
Bell, which the court said in the Young case, supra, is
sufficient to make the side agreement (note) void, as
against public policy.
Counsel also argued In the court below, that from
the closing statement (defendant's Ex. 11, Ab. 13) it is
stated in paragraph 5, "This loan is approved on condition that all debts both secured and unsecured are scaled
dowrn to an amount not to exceed $4700.00." But we submit that Alfred J. Bell is :not in any position to take advantage of ·such statement. Such statement did not apply
to him. That debt limit, _$4 700.00, apparently W3Js the
The three
total of all debts, ·secured and unsecured.
creditors who claimed liens on the premises, were required to sign scaledown agreements. Hence, said paragraph
5 continues: "We are in receipt of an Agreement from
each of the following, by the terms of which he agrees to
accept the following sum in full satisfaction of his claim:
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Louis F. Bodrero ---------------------------- $1850.00
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation $1100.00
Alfred J. Bell ---------------------------------- $ 150.00''
That the bank was thus definitely led to believe that
the three creditors named were accepting the respective
amounts set opposite their names as full satisfaction of
their respective claims, is further borne out by the second paragraph i:n paragraph No. 7 of said closing statement (Ab. 13-14):
"We have been informed by the applicant that the
following creditors are to receive approximately the following amounts from loan proceeds:
Name of Creditor

Approximate Claim

Louis F. Bodrero ------------------------------ $1850.00
Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation $1100.00
Alfred J. Bell ------------------------------------$ 150.00"
We further submit, the debt from Jones to Bell was
discharged by an accord and satisfa:ction, when the scaledown agreement was signed, by which agre.ement Alfred
J. Bell agreed to accel!t and was paid $150.00 as full
satisfaction of the existing obligation between them.
What the total amount of that obligation was, is relatively unimportant. The important thing is that Bell agreed
to accept $150.00 from the Federal Land Bank
as full satisfaction of the existing obligation.
That the F,ederal Land Bank undeiiStood by the
sig.ned scaledown agreement, in this ·case, that each of
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·the three creditors had agreed to accept the amount stat-

ed irn the respective scaledown agrreements, is evident,
and is conclusively ·shown from the statement hereabove
quoted, which we take the liberty to repeat: "We are in
receipt of an agreement from each of the following, by
the terms of which he agrees to accept the following sum
in full satisfaction of his claim: Alfred J. Bell, $150.00."
The mere fact that Alfred J. Bell wrote in "$400.00",
as the existing obligation, should not put him in any favored position. That was a misrepresentation, (if the existing obligation was larger than $400.00) and was apparently part of Bell's scheme to obtain a

secret side

agreement (the promissory note for $850.00) in violation
of his scaledown agreement, which the courts have uniformly held is against public policy and against the rules
and regulations of the Farm Loan Act,

and therefore

void and unenforceable.
The following cases are in point, to the effect that a
debt is discharged by way of accord and satisfaction
through payment, by or through a third party., of less
than the amount of the debt, which payment is accepted
by the creditor as settlement in full of the debt:
Cunni,ngham vs. Irwin, 182 Mich. 629, 148 N. W. 786;
People vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 195 Mich. 738, 162
N. W. 338;
Birenberg vs. Haxgmas, 273 Mich. 1932, 262 N. W.
914;
Jessewish vs. Abbne, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp.
599;
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539;

Partride vs. 'Monynihan, 59 Misc. 234, 110 N. Y. Sup.
Seaver vs. Ransom, 224, N. Y. 233.

1 Am. J ur. 247, Sigler vs. Sigler, 98 Kan. 324, 158 P.
864, L. R. A. 1917A, 725.
Lastly, the court erred in dismissing the defendant's
·counterclaim for $277.70 (Assignment of Error No. 3)
paid by appellant on the said note, which in fact was unjustly and illegally taken and was also given through mistake and inadvertance, as we have heretofore shown.
Under such circumstances we respectfully submit that
the payments totaling $277.70, which are undisputed,
which Bell collected from Jones, ,should be returned and
Jones should have been granted judgment for said amount
as prayed for in his counter claim.
For each and all of the foregoing reasons we respectively submit that the trial court erred in entering judgment against appellant on the note sued on, and further
erred in holding that the amount of the judgment as
rendered represents tre balance due on the purchase
price on the premises described in the said judgment.
We submit the court also erred in ruling to enter judgment on his counter claim for the money which had been
wrongfully collected against him on said note.
Respectfully submitted,
LEON FONNESBECK,
Attorney for Defendant wnd Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. 6239

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-*tlil_, . . . . _.. ... _ . . _ _ _ ..,.

\t.~

A. M. BELL,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
PARLEY P. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

-------------BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

____ ________ _
..,.

HARVEY C. SWEITZER,

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent.
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